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European countries need to expand employment among older individuals. Many papers have examined 
this issue from different angles. However, very few seem to have considered its gender dimension 
properly, despite evidence that lifting the overall senior employment rate requires significantly raising 
that of women older than 50.  The key issue examined by this paper is whether employers are willing to 
employ more older workers, in particular older women. The answer depends to a large extent on the 
ratio of older individuals’ productivity to their cost to employers. To address this question we tap into a 
unique firm-level panel of Belgian data to produce robust evidence on the causal effect of age/gender on 
productivity and labour costs. We take advantage of the panel structure to identify age/gender-related 
differences from within-firm variation. Moreover, inspired by recent developments in the production 
function estimation literature, we address the problem of endogeneity of the age/gender mix, using a 
structural production function estimator (Olley & Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003) alongside IV-
GMM methods where lagged value of labour inputs are used as instruments. Our results indicate a small 
negative impact of larger shares of older men on the productivity-labour cost ratio. An increment of 
10%-points of in their share causes a 0.17 to 0.69%-point contraction. However, the main result is that 
the equivalent handicap with older women is larger, ranging from 1.3 to 2.0%-points. This is not good 
news for older women’s employability. And the vast services industry does not seem to offer working 
conditions that mitigate older women’s disadvantage, on the contrary. 
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1 1. Introduction 
In most EU countries, demographics (ageing populations
1) and public policy
2 (reforms aimed at raising 
the employment rate of older individuals) will combine to increase the share of older workers in the 
labour force.  Across the EU, there is also the fact that older women are clearly less present in 
employment than older men.
3  But this should change. The first point we raise in this paper is that a 
greying workforce will also become more female. Two elements combine in support of this 
prediction. The first one is the lagged effect
4 of the rising overall female participation in the labour 
force (Peracchi & Welch, 1994).
5 The second factor is labour policy. Policymakers will concentrate 
on promoting older women’s employment because - conditional on a certain young- or prime-age 
participation record - women still leave the labour market earlier than men
6 (Fitzenberger et al., 
2004).  
The second focal point of this paper is the idea that higher employment among the older segments 
of the EU population (male or female) will only materialise if firms are willing to employ these 
individuals. One cannot take for granted that older individuals who are willing to work - and are 
strongly enticed to do so because (early) retirement benefits are no longer accessible - do obtain 
employment. Anecdotal evidence abounds to suggest that firms “shed” older workers. Dorn & 
Sousa-Poza (2010)
7 show, for instance, that involuntary early retirement is the rule rather than the 
exception in several continental European countries: in Germany, Portugal and Hungary more than 
half of all early retirements are, reportedly, not by choice.  
The existing economic literature primarily covers the supply side of the old-age labour market. It 
examines the (pre)retirement behaviour of older individuals (Mitchell & Fields, 1983) and its 
determinants, for example how the generosity of early pension and other welfare regimes entices 
people to withdraw from the labour force (Saint Paul, 2009).  In the Belgian case, there is strong 
                                                 
1   For instance Göbel and Zwick (2009) show that between 1987 and 2007 the average age of the workforce in the 
EU25 has risen from 36.2 to 38.9. In Belgium, between 1999 and 2009 the share of individuals aged 50-65 in the 
total population aged 15-65 rose from 25.2% to 28.8% (http://statbel.fgov.be). 
2   The Lisbon Agenda suggested raising employment of individuals aged 55-64 to at least 50% by 2010.  
3   See the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) 2010.  
4   Also referred to as a cohort effect. 
5   Driven, inter alia, by a higher educational attainment of women and a lower fertility of the younger generations. 
6   In other words, life-cycle participation/employment profiles vary by gender. And the female profiles have not 
changed markedly across cohorts. 
7   The International Social Survey Program data (ISSP) allows them to identify individuals who i) were early retirees 
and ii) assessed their own status as being involuntary, using the item "I retired early - by choice" or "I retired early - 
not by choice" from the questionnaire. 
2 evidence that easy access
8 and high replacement rates (Blondäl & Scarpetta, 1999; Lefèbvre, 2008; 
Jousten et al., 2008) have played a significant role in the drop in the employment rate among older 
individuals since the mid 1970s.  Other papers with a supply-side focus examine how poor health 
status precipitates retirement (Kalwij & Vermeulen, 2008) or the importance of non-economic 
factors (i.e. family considerations) in the decision of older women to retire (Pozzebon & Mitchell, 
1989 ; Weaver, 1994).  
The demand side of the labour market for older individuals has started to receive some attention 
from economists. Several authors have examined the relationship between age and productivity at 
the level where this matters most: firms. They estimate production functions expanded by the 
specification of a labour-quality index à la Hellerstein & Neumark (1999) (HN henceforth).
9 
According to Malmberg et al. (2008), an accumulation of high shares of older adults in Swedish 
manufacturing plants does not negatively impact plant-level productivity. Similarly, the analysis of 
German data by Göbel & Zwick (2009) produces little evidence of an age-related productivity 
decline. By contrast, Grund & Westergård-Nielsen (2008) find that both mean age and age 
dispersion in Danish firms are inversely U-shaped in relation to firms’ productivity. Finally, 
Lallemand & Ryck (2009), using Belgian firm-level survey data,
10 show that older workers (>49) 
are significantly less productive than prime-aged workers, particularly in ICT firms.  
But, to adequately assess the effect of age on labour demand, one needs to focus simultaneously on 
firm-level productivity and pay (or labour costs). Under proper assumptions (see Section 2), this 
amounts to analysing the sensitivity of the productivity-labour cost ratio to the age structure of 
firms. One of the first papers that combined the productivity and labour cost dimensions was that of 
Hellerstein  et al. (1999). These authors estimated productivity and wages equations (using 
American firm-level data that included information on the age structure of the workforce) and found 
that both wages and productivity tend to increase with age. Aubert & Crépont (2004, 2007), in turn, 
observed that the productivity of French workers rises with age until around the age of 40, before 
stabilizing, a path which is very similar to that of wages. But a negative effect on the productivity-
labour cost ratio is observed with rising shares of workers aged over 55. The majority of papers 
                                                 
8   While the age of 58 is a priori the minimum access age, a lower age of 55, 56 or 57 is possible in some sectors 
(steel, glass, textile, etc.), presumably reflecting more arduous working conditions. Similar exceptions exist for 
some workers in the building industry and those who worked shifts. Even more pronounced reductions in the 
minimum age are possible when the company is recognized as being in real trouble, under which circumstance the 
age can be brought down to 52 years, or even 50. 
9   The key idea of HN is to estimate a production function (or a labour-cost function), with heterogeneous labour 
input, where different types (e.g. men/women, young/old) diverge in terms of productivity. 
10   The Structure of Earnings Survey and the Structure of Business Survey conducted by Statistics Belgium.  
3 based on firm-level data conclude that firm productivity has an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
age, while labour costs are either rising with age or flat beyond a certain threshold (Myck, 2010), 
with a negative impact on the productivity-labour cost ratio after 55 (Skirbekk, 2004, 2008). 
However, van Ours & Stoeldraijer (2010), in their recent analysis of Dutch manufacturing firm-
level data, find little evidence of much age-related negative impact on the productivity-labour cost 
ratio.  
Our point is that none of the existing papers has adequately considered the gender dimension of 
ageing, in a context where women are likely to form a growing part of the older labour force. This 
paper aims at filling that void. We try to assess the current willingness of employers to (re)employ 
older male and female workers. And we posit that the answer to this question largely depends on 
how larger shares of older (male or female) workers affect private firms’ productivity-labour cost 
ratio. We assume in particular that a sizeable negative impact of older men/women on that ratio can 
adversely affect their respective chances of being employed. 
In this paper we also use firm-level direct measures of productivity and labour cost. Our Belgian 
data
11 permit a direct estimation of age-gender/productivity-labour cost ratio profiles, where the 
parameter estimates associated with the shares of older workers (male and female) in the workforce 
can be directly interpreted as conducive to weak or strong labour demand or employability (more on 
this in Section 2). Our measure of firms’ productivity (valued added) enhances comparability of 
data across industries, which vary in their degree of vertical integration (Hellerstein et al., 1999).  
Moreover, we know with great accuracy how much firms spend on their employees. Some studies 
use individual information on gross wages, whereas we use firm-level information on annual gross 
wages plus social security contributions and other related costs. Our data also contain information 
on firms from the large and expanding services industry
12, where administrative and intellectual 
work is predominant, and where female employment is important. Many observers would probably 
posit that age and gender matters less for productivity in a service-based economy than in one 
where agriculture or industry dominates. Finally, it is worth stressing that our panel comprised a 
sizeable number of firms (9,000+) and covered a relatively long period running from 1998 to 2006.  
                                                 
11   The raw firm-level data are retrieved from Belfirst. They are matched with data from Belgian’s Social Security 
register containing detailed information about the characteristics of the employees in those firms, namely their age. 
12   According the most recent statistics of the Belgian National Bank (http://www.nbb.be/belgostat), at the end of 2008 
services (total employment – agriculture, industry and construction) accounted for 78% of total employment, which 
is four percentage points more than 10 years earlier.  Similar figures and trends characterize other EU and OECD 
countries. 
4 In this paper, we try to find evidence of a negative (or positive) effect on i) average productivity, ii) 
average labour costs and iii) the productivity-labour cost ratio
13 of larger shares of older (male and 
female) workers. We also employ the framework pioneered by HN, which consists of estimating 
production and/or labour cost functions that explicitly account for labour heterogeneity. Applied to 
firm-level data, this methodology presents two main advantages. First, it delivers productivity 
differences across age/gender groups that can immediately be compared to a measure of labour 
costs differences, thereby  identifying the net contribution of an age/gender group to the 
productivity-labour cost ratio (which can be directly interpreted as conducive to weak or strong 
employability). Second, it measures and tests for the presence of market-wide impact on the 
productivity-labour cost ratio that can affect the overall labour demand for the category of workers 
considered.  
The HN methodology is suitable for analysing a wide range of workers’ characteristics, such as 
race, education, gender and marital status, e.g. Hellerstein & Neumark (1999), Hellerstein et 
al.(1999), Borowczyk, Martins & Vandenberghe (2010), and richer data sets regarding employees, 
e.g. Crépon, Deniau & Pérez-Duarte (2002). In this paper, we focus exclusively on gender and age.  
From the econometric standpoint, recent developments of HN’s methodology have tried to improve 
the estimation of the production function by the adoption of alternative techniques to deal with a 
potential heterogeneity bias (unobserved time-invariant determinants of firms’ productivity that are 
correlated with labour inputs) and simultaneity bias (endogeneity in input choices in the short run 
that includes firm’s age-gender mix). A standard solution to the heterogeneity bias is to resort to 
fixed-effect analysis (FE henceforth), be it via first-differencing or mean-centring of panel data. As 
to the endogeneity bias, the past 15 years has seen the introduction of new identification 
techniques.
14  One set of techniques follows the dynamic panel literature (Arellano & Bond, 1991; 
Aubert & Crépon, 2003; Blundell & Bond, 2000; Göbel & Zwick, 2009; or van Ours & Stoeldraijer, 
2010), which basically consists of using lagged values of labour inputs as instrumental variables (IV 
henceforth). A second set of techniques, initially advocated by Olley & Pakes (1996) or more 
recently by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) (LP henceforth), are somewhat more structural in nature. 
They consist of using observed intermediate input decisions (i.e. purchases of raw materials, 
services, electricity...) to “control” for (or proxy) unobserved short-term productivity shocks. 
                                                 
13   Strictly speaking the expression “productivity-labour cost ratio” used throughout this paper refers to the ratio of i) 
the difference between a firm’s value added (Y) and its labour costs (W), and ii) to the firm’s labour costs, i.e. (Y-
W)/W. 
14   See Ackerberg, Caves & Frazer (2006) for a recent review. 
5  
In this paper, we follow these most recent applications of HN’s methodology. We combine and 
compare all the above-mentioned econometric techniques (FE, IV, OP-LP). Our main results are all 
based on within-firm variation that we derive from the use of FE (namely first differences). What is 
more, to control for the potential endogeneity of the share of old men and women employed by 
firms, in our preferred estimation methods we combine first differences with i) IV techniques and ii) 
the LP intermediate-goods proxy approach, which we implement using information on firms’ 
varying level of intermediate consumption.
15  
 
The lax rules in terms of access and relatively high replacement rates characterizing the Belgian 
(pre)pension regimes are traditionally emphasized to explain the country’s low employment rate among 
individuals aged 50 and over. This paper contains evidence that the latter could also be demand-driven. 
Firms based in Belgium face financial disincentives to employing older workers - particularly older 
women. Our most important results in this respect are those derived from the regression of the 
productivity-labour cost ratio on the share of older men and women.  Using prime-age men as a 
reference, we show that a 10%-points rise in the share of older men causes a modest 0.16 to 0.69%-
point reduction in the productivity-labour cost ratio. However, the situation is different for older 
women. Our preferred estimates suggest that a 10%-points expansion of their share in the firm’s 
workforce causes a 1.3 to 2%-points reduction in the productivity-labour cost ratio; something that 
negatively affects their employability. Using prime-age women as a reference, we find that 10%-
points expansion of old women’s share causes a contraction of the productivity-labour cost ratio in 
the range of 1.1 to 1.24%-points. And these negative effects are even larger when we restrict the 
analysis to subsamples of firms (i.e. balanced panel, services industry). The ultimate point is that 
these results raise questions about the feasibility, in the current context, of a policy aimed at 
boosting the employment rate of older women. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, our methodological choices regarding the 
estimation of the production, labour cost and production-labour cost ratio functions are unfolded. 
Section 3 is devoted to an exposition of the dataset. Sections 4 and 5 contain the results and main 
conclusions respectively. 
                                                 
15   It is calculated here as the differences between the firm’s turnover (in nominal terms) and its net value added. It 
reflects the value of goods and services consumed or used up as inputs in production by enterprises, including raw 
materials and services bought on the market. 
6 2. Methodology 
In order to estimate age-gender productivity profiles, following most authors in this area, we 
consider a Cobb-Douglas production function (Hellerstein et al., 1999; Aubert & Crépon, 2003, 
2007; Dostie, 2006; van Ours & Stoeldraijer, 2010): 
ln (Yit /Lit)=lnA + α ln QLit +ß lnKit - lnLit  (1) 
where: Yit /Lit is the average value added per worker (average productivity hereafter) in firm i at 
time t, QLit  is an aggregation of different types of workers, and Kit is the stock of capital.  
The variable that reflects the heterogeneity of the workforce is the quality of labour index QLit. Let 
Likt be the number of workers of type k (e.g. young, prime-age, old/men, women) in firm i at time t, 
and  µik  be their productivity. We assume that workers of various types are substitutable with 
different marginal products. As each type of worker k is assumed to be an input in quality of labour 
aggregate, the latter can be specified as: 
QLit = ∑k µik Likt = µi0 Lit + ∑k >0 (µik - µi0) Likt  (2) 
where: Lit ≡∑k Likt is the total number of workers in the firm, µi0 the marginal productivity of the 
reference category of workers (e.g. prime-age men) and µik that of the other types of workers. 
If we further assume that a worker has the same marginal product across firms, we can drop 
subscript i from the marginal productivity coefficients. After taking logarithms and doing some 
rearrangements equation (2) becomes: 
ln QLit = ln µ0 + lnLit + ln (1+ ∑k >0 (λk  - 1) Pikt)  (3) 
where λk≡µk/µ0 is the relative productivity of type k worker and Pikt≡ Likt/Lit the proportion/share of 
type k workers over the total number of workers in firm i . 
Since ln(1+x)≈ x, we can approximate (3) by: 
ln QLit = ln µ0 + ln Lit + ∑k >0 (λk  - 1) Pikt  (4) 
And the production function becomes: 
7 ln(Yit /Lit)=lnA+ α [lnµ0 + ln Lit
 +
 ∑k >0 (λk -1) Pikt] + ß lnKit - lnLik  (5) 
 
Or, equivalently, if k=0,1,….N with k=0 being the reference group (e.g. prime-age male workers) 
ln (Yit /Lit)= B + (α-1)lit
 + η1 Pi1t + … ηN PiNt + ß kit   (6) 
where: 
 
B=lnA+α ln µ0  
λk=µk/µ0 k-=1…N 
 
η1 = α (λ1  – 1) 
…. 




Note first that (6), being loglinear in P, has coefficients can be directly interpreted as the percentage 
change in the firm’s average labour productivity of a 1 unit (here 100 percentage points) change of 
the considered type of workers’ share among the employees of the firm. Note also that, strictly 
speaking, in order to obtain a type k worker’s relative marginal productivity, (i.e. λk), coefficients ηk 
have to be divided by α, and 1 needs to be added to the result.
16 
 
A similar approach can be applied to a firm’s average labour cost. If we assume that firms operating 
in the same labour market pay the same wages to the same category of workers, we can drop 
subscript i from the remuneration coefficient π.
17 Let πk stand for the remuneration of type workers 
(k=0 being reference type). Then the average labour cost per worker becomes: 
 
Wit /Lit= ∑k πk Likt / Lit =π0 + ∑k >0 (πk - π0) Likt/ Lit  (7) 
 
Taking the logarithm and using again log(1+x)≈ x, we can approximate this by: 
                                                 
16   Does all this matter in practice? Our experience with firm-level data suggests values for ß ranging from 0.6 to 0.8 
(these values are in line with what most authors estimates for the share of labour in firms’ output/added valye). This 
means that λk are larger (in absolute value) than ηk.. If anything, estimates reported in the first column of Tables 2, 3 
and Appendix 2 underestimate the true marginal productivity difference vis-à-vis prime-age workers. 
 
17   We will see, how, in practice via the inclusion of dummies, this assumption can be relaxed to account for sectoral 
wage effects. 
8 ln(Wt /Lit)= ln π0 + ∑k >0 (Φk  - 1) Pikt  (8) 
 
where the Greek letter Φk ≡ πk/ π0 denotes the relative remuneration of type k workers (k>0) with 
respect to the (k=0) reference group, and Pik= Lik/Li0 is again the proportion/share of type k workers 
over the total number of workers in firm i . 
The logarithm of the average labour cost finally becomes: 
 




1 Pi1t + … η
w




w =ln π0 
η
w




N = (ΦN – 1) 
 
Like in the average productivity equation (6) coefficients η
w
k capture the sensitivity to changes of 
the age/gender structure (Pikt).  
 
The key hypothesis test of this paper can now be easily formulated. Assuming spot labour markets 
and cost-minimizing firms the null hypothesis of no impact on the productivity-labour cost ratio for 
type k worker implies ηk = η
w
k. Any negative (or positive) difference between these two coefficients 
can be interpreted as a quantitative measure of the disincentive (incentive) to employ the category 
of workers considered. This is a test that can easily implemented, if we adopt strictly equivalent 
econometric specifications for the average productivity and average labour cost; in particular if we 
introduce firm size (l) and capital stock (k) in the labour cost equation (9). Considering three age 
groups (1=[20-29], 2=[30-49]; 3=[50-64[) and with prime-age (30-49) male workers forming the 
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What is more, if we take the difference between the logarithms of average productivity (10) and 
labour costs
18 (11) we get a direct expression of the productivity-labour cost ratio
19 as a linear 
function of its workforce determinants. 



























































It is immediate to see that coefficients η
G
 of equation (12) provide a direct estimate of how the 
productivity-labour cost ratio is affected by changes in terms of percentages/shares of employed 
workers.  
 
Note also the inclusion in (12) of the vector of controls Fit . The latter comprises total labour/firm 
size (l) and the amount of capital (k). In all the estimations presented hereafter Fit also contains 
region
20, year and sector
21 dummies. This allows for systematic and proportional productivity 
variation among firms along these dimensions. This assumption can be seen to expand the model by 
controlling for year and sector-specific productivity shocks or trends, labour quality and intensity of 
efficiency wages differentials across sectors and other sources of systematic productivity 
differentials (Hellerstein & Neumark, 1999). More importantly, since the data set we use do not 
                                                 
18   Labour costs used in this paper, which were measured independently of net-value added, include the value of all 
monetary compensations paid to the total labour force (both full- and part-time, permanent and temporary), 
including social security contributions paid by the employers, throughout the year. The summary statistics of the 
variables in the data set are presented in Table 1. 
19   Measured in %. This is because the logarithms, used in conjunction with differencing, convert absolute differences 
into relative (i.e., percentage) differences: i.e. (Y-W)/W. 
20   NUTS1 Belgian regions : Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels. 
21   NACE2 level. 
10 contain sector price deflators, the introduction of these dummies can control for asymmetric 
variation in the price of firms’ outputs at sector level. An extension along the same dimensions is 
made with respect to the labour cost equation. Of course, the assumption of segmented labour 
markets, implemented by adding linearly to the labour cost equation the set of year/sector dummies, 
is valid as long there is proportional variation in wages by age/gender group along those dimensions 
(Hellerstein et al., 1999). 
 
It is also worth stressing the inclusion in Fit of firm-level information on the (log of) average 
number of hours worked annually per employee; obtained by dividing the total number of hours 
reportedly worked annually by the number of employees (full-time or part-time ones 
indistinctively). The resulting variable is strongly correlated with the intensity of part-time work. 
Although there is little evidence that older workers more systematically resort to part-time work in 
Belgium, it seems reasonably to control for this likely source of bias when studying the causal 
relationship between age-gender and productivity, labour cost or the ratio between these two.  
But, as to proper identification of the causal links, the main challenge consists of dealing with the 
various constituents of the residual εit of equation (10).
22 We assume that the latter has a structure 
that comprises three elements: 
εit =θi + ωit + σit  (13) 
where: cov(θi, Pik,t) ≠ 0, cov(ωit, Pik,t) ≠ 0, E(σit)=0 
In other words, the OLS sample-error term potentially consists of i) an unobservable firm fixed 
effect θi; ii) a short-term shock that is anticipated by the firm (but not by the econometrician), ωit , 
and, iii) a purely random shock σit.  
Parameter  θi. in (13) represents firm-specific characteristics that are unobservable but driving 
average productivity. For example the vintage of capital in use, the overall stock of human capital
23, 
firm-specific managerial skills, location-driven comparative advantages.
24 And these might be 
correlated with the age-gender structure of the firm’s workforce, biasing OLS results. Older 
workers for instance might be overrepresented among plants built a long time ago using older 
technology. However, the panel structure of our data allows for the estimation of models with firm 
                                                 
22   And its equivalent in equation (12). 
23   At least the part of that stock that is not affected by short-term recruitments and separations. 
24   Motorway/airport in the vicinity of logistic firms for instance. 
11 fixed effects (FE). The results from the FE estimation (using first differences in our case) can be 
interpreted as follows: a group (e.g. male or female) is estimated to be more (less) productive than 
another group if, within firms, a increase of that group’s share in the overall workforce translates 
into productivity gains (loss). Algebraically, the estimated FE model corresponds to  
∆ln (Yit /Lit)=∆B
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where the ∆ operator reflects first differences.  With FE estimation the error term of the production 
equation becomes: 
 
∆εit = ∆ωit + ∆σit  (17) 
where cov(∆ωit, ∆Pit
k) ≠ 0 and E(∆σit)=0 
This said, the greatest econometric challenge is to go around the simultaneity/endogeneity bias 
(Griliches & Mairesse, 1995). The economics underlying that concern is intuitive. In the short run, 
firms could be confronted to productivity deviations, ωit; say, a lower turnover, itself the 
consequence of a missed sales opportunity. Contrary to the econometrician, firms may know about 
ωit (and similarly about ∆ωit). An anticipated downturn can translate into a recruitment freeze.  
Since the latter predominantly affects youth, we should expect that the share of older (male/female) 
workers to increase during negative spells, and decrease during positive ones. This would generate 
negative correlation between the share of older (male/female) workers and the productivity of firms, 
thereby leading to underestimated estimates of the their relative productivity when resorting to OLS 
or even FE estimates. 
To account for the presence of this endogeneity bias we first estimate the relevant parameters of our 
model using IV techniques. This is a strategy regularly used in the production function literature 
with labour heterogeneity (Aubert & Crépon, 2003, 2007; van Ours & Stoeldraijer, 2010). Our 
12 choice is to instrument the potentially endogenous first-differenced worker shares (∆Pit
k) with their 
second differences (∆Pit
k - ∆Pit-1
k) and lagged second differences (∆Pit-1
k- ∆Pit-2
k) i.e. past changes of 
the annual variations of the worker age/gender mix. The key assumptions are that these past 
changes are i) uncorrelated with current year-to-year changes of the productivity term ∆ωit, but ii) 
still reasonably correlated with those of the workers’ shares ∆Pit
k.  
An alternative to IV that seems promising and relevant it to adopt the more structural approach 
initiated by Olley & Pakes (1998) (OP hereafter) and further developed by Levinsohn & Petrin 
(2003), and used recently by Dostie (2006). The essence of the OP approach is to use some function 
of a firm’s investment to control for time-varying unobserved productivity ωit. The drawback of this 
method is that only observations with positive investment levels can be used in the estimation. 
Many firms indeed report no investment in short panels. LP overcome this problem by using 
material inputs (raw materials, electricity,...) instead of investment in the estimation of unobserved 
productivity. They argue that firms can swiftly (and also at a relatively low cost) respond to 
productivity developments ωit by adapting the volume of the intermediate inputs they buy on the 
market. Whenever information of intermediate inputs is available in a data set — which happens to 
be the case with ours — it can be used to proxy short-term productivity deviations.  
Following OP, LP assume that the demand for intermediate inputs (intit) is a function of the time-
varying unobserved productivity level ωit as well as the current level of capital: 
intit =f(ωit , kit)  (18) 
 
LP further assume that this function is monotonic in ωit and kit, meaning that it can be inverted  to 
deliver an expression of ωit as a function of intit and kit. In the LP framework, the residual (13) 
becomes: 
εit = θi + f
-1(intit, kit)  + σit  (19) 
And LP argue that ωit=f
-1(intit, kit)  that can be approximated by a 3
rd order polynomial expansion in 
intit and kit.. We replicate this strategy here. However, unlike LP or OP, we do this in combination 
with first differences to account for firm fixed effects θi. In a sense, we stick to what has 
traditionally been done in the dynamic panel literature underpinning the IV strategy discussed 
above. We also believe that explicitly accounting for firm fixed effects increases the chance of 
verifying the key monotonicity assumption required by the LP approach in order to invert out ωit, 
and completely remove the endogeneity problem.  
13 Algebraically, our strategy simply consists of implementing LP to variables (the initial ones + those 
generated to form the LP polynomial expansion term
25) that have been first-differenced. 
Justification is straightforward. First-differencing means that one deals with an expression of the 
residuals equals to 
∆εit = ∆(f
-1(intit, kit)) + ∆σit  (20) 
If one assumes, like LP,  that the inverse demand function f
-1 (.) can be proxied by a 3
rd order 
polynomial expansion in intit and kit,, that expression becomes 
∆εit = ∆(χ+ υ1 intit + …+ υ3 int
3
it + υ4 kit + …+ υ5 k
3
it + υ6 int
2
itkit + υ7 intitk
2
it + …) + ∆σit(21) 
As the first-difference operator applies to a linear expression, the above notation is thus equivalent 
to  
∆εit = υ1 ∆intit + …+ υ3 ∆(int
3




itkit )+ υ7 ∆(intitk
2
it)+ …. + ∆σit
  (22) 
3. Data description 
As already stated, we are in possession of a panel of around 9,000 firms with more than 20 
employees, largely documented in terms of sector, location, size, capital used, labour cost levels and 
productivity (value added). These observations come from the Belfirst database. Via the so-called 
Carrefour data warehouse, using firm identifiers, we have been able to inject information on the 
age/gender of (all) workers employed by these firms, and this for a period running from 1998 to 
2006.  
 
A weakness of our dataset is that is does not contain the workers’ educational attainment. The point 
is that younger cohorts are better-educated and, for that reason, potentially more productive than 
older ones.  As we do not control for educational attainment, how much is this likely to bias our 
productivity-by-age (and gender) estimates?  Not so much, we think, for two reasons. First, 
although we do not observe education, our vector of controls Fit comprises good firm-level proxies 
for education (i.e. the share or blue-collar workers and the share of managers). Second, as stated 
above, we identify the effect of age on productivity from within-firm variation of age/gender shares 
over (panel/observation) time. With  first differences, identification comes from the comparison 
                                                 














between i) productivity gains achieved by firms with rising shares of old (50-64) workers ii) and those 
obtained by firms with no (or less of) such rises.  How do the two types of firms compare in terms of 
cohort changes between t and t+1? By definition, the average year of birth rose in both types of 
firms.  In a panel, cohort/year-of-birth and time of observation are monotonically related: individuals 
belonging to a particular age band in t+1 are more likely to belong to younger cohorts than those 
observed in t in the same age band. Still, the workers’ average year of birth has probably risen more 
in the second type of firms, due to a more pronounced propensity to replace older workers by 
younger ones. But even so, we would argue that the resulting asymmetries in terms human capital 
dynamics (not captured by the firm-level proxies mentioned above) are unlikely to correlate with short-
term productivity differences across the two types of firms. This is because it probably takes time for 
firms to mobilise the extra (general) human capital younger cohorts bring along. 
 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. They suggest that firms based in Belgium have been 
largely affected by ageing over the period considered. Table 1 shows that between 1998 and 2006, 
the mean age of workers active in private firms located in Belgium rose by almost 3 years: from 
36.2 to 39.1. This is very similar what has occurred Europe-wide. For instance Göbel & Zwick 
(2009) show that between 1987 and 2007 the average age of the workforce in the EU25 has risen 
from 36.2 to 38.9. Table 1 also shows that, in the Belgian private economy, between 1998 and 
2006, the percentage of old male workers (50-65) has risen steadily from 10% to almost 15%. And 
the proportion of older women has risen even more dramatically, from 2% to 4.1%.  
 
Intermediate inputs pay a key role in our analysis, as they are central to one of the two strategies we 
use overcome the simultaneity or endogeneity bias (see Section 2).  The level of intermediate inputs 
used by a firm is calculated here as the difference between its turnover (in nominal terms) and net 
value-added. It reflects the  value of goods and services  consumed or used up as inputs in 
production by that firm, including raw materials, services and various other operating expenses (see 
4
th column from the right in Table 1 for descriptive statistics). 
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Table 1: Belfirst-Carrefour unbalanced panel. Basic descriptive statistics: mean (Standard deviation)  





















age   18-29 30-49  50-64 18-29 30-49 50-64 
Intermedia
te goods 













66.03 39.01  0.40  107.86  6402  36.16  0.338 0.298  0.100 0.147 0.095 0.021  27991 0.57 0.01  1661.07  1998 8265 
(106.59) (26.81)  (0.40)  (474.31)  (95642)  (4.29)  (0.18) (0.16)  (0.09) (0.17) (0.11) (0.04)  (158639) (0.35) (0.05) (270.46) 
69.10  40.29  0.40  111.05  6561  36.44  0.326  0.303  0.105  0.144  0.100  0.022  28466  0.57  0.01  1659.24  1999  8431 
(182.35)  (23.94)  (0.42)  (474.76)  (99485)  (4.24)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (162346)  (0.35)  (0.04)  (272.37) 
69.46 41.26  0.39  113.75  6843  36.65  0.315 0.305  0.109 0.143 0.104 0.024  34447 0.56 0.01  1639.33  2000 8624 
(110.10) (22.91)  (0.42)  (471.75)  (107777)  (4.21)  (0.17) (0.15)  (0.09) (0.16) (0.11) (0.04)  (222657) (0.35) (0.05) (252.62) 
69.47  42.73  0.37  121.06  7424  37.01  0.303  0.310  0.114  0.139  0.109  0.026  35869  0.55  0.01  1623.49  2001  8825 
(99.05)  (23.95)  (0.40)  (511.26)  (114725)  (4.19)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (256231)  (0.35)  (0.04)  (257.45) 
71.96 44.67  0.35  127.59  7960  37.39  0.291 0.315  0.118 0.134 0.113 0.028  37472 0.54 0.01  1611.62  2002 8966 
(189.14) (34.31)  (0.39)  (689.97)  (125480)  (4.16)  (0.16) (0.15)  (0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.05)  (271372) (0.35) (0.04) (253.42) 
73.19  45.47  0.35  127.35  8390  37.99  0.277  0.316  0.131  0.128  0.115  0.032  38153  0.54  0.01  1597.14  2003  9051 
(101.82)  (23.95)  (0.39)  (643.51)  (133174)  (4.26)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (254540)  (0.35)  (0.04)  (228.56) 
76.49 46.95  0.37  129.36  8725  38.35  0.267 0.320  0.137 0.123 0.119 0.034  42160 0.54 0.01  1611.07  2004 9060 
(91.16) (26.27)  (0.38)  (644.25)  (141718)  (4.28)  (0.15) (0.15)  (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.05)  (296393.55) (0.35)  (0.03)  (226.40) 
78.86 48.26  0.36  131.55  7976  38.73  0.258 0.323  0.142 0.117 0.122 0.037  47597 0.53 0.01  1594.23  2005 9036 
(101.11) (28.32)  (0.40)  (644.64)  (60537)  (4.24)  (0.15) (0.15)  (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.05)  (416162) (0.35) (0.04) (228.21) 
81.10 49.31  0.37  133.41  8155  39.11  0.249 0.322  0.149 0.113 0.125 0.041  52837 0.52 0.01  1572.85  2006 8936 
(96.90) (30.24)  (0.41)  (638.59)  (59825)  (4.25)  (0.14) (0.14)  (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.06)  (510248) (0.35) (0.04) (211.68) 
Source: Belfirst-Carrefour panel, our calculus  
Figure 1 (left panel) displays how the (log of) average productivity and the (log of) average labour 
costs evolve with mean age, for the year 2006 subsample. The right panel of Figure 1 corresponds 
to the difference between these two curves which is equal to the productivity-labour cost ratio.
26 
These stylised facts suggests that, in the Belgian private economy, the productivity-labour cost ratio 
rises up to the (mean) age of 35-38 where it reaches 40%, but then declines steadily. It falls below 
the 10% threshold when mean age exceeds 55.   
 
Figure 2 is probably more directly echoing the main issue raised in this paper. It depicts the 
relationship between the share or older (50-64) men or women and the productivity-labour cost 
ratio. It suggests that firms employing shares of older men and women in excess of the 7-8% 
threshold have a significantly smaller productivity-labour cost ratio. It is also shows that firms 
employing a given share of older women systematically achieve a lower ratio than firms employing 
the same share of older men. 
 
                                                 
26   Logarithms, used in conjunction with differencing, convert absolute differences (Y-W) into relative differences: i.e. 
(Y-W)/W. 
 
17 Figure 1: (Left panel) Average productivity  and average labour costs. (Right panel) Productivity-
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Curves on display correspond to locally weighted regression of y (i.e. log of average productivity, log of average labour 
cost [left panel] and labour costs ratio [right panel])  on x (i.e. mean age).  OLS estimates of y are fitted for each subsets 
of x. This method  does not required to specify a global function of any form to fit a model to the data, only to fit 
segments of the data. It is thus semi-parametric. 
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Curves on display correspond to locally weighted regression of y (productivity-labour cost ratio)  on x (shares). It does 
this by fitting an OLS estimate of y for each subsets of x. This method does not require to specify a global function of 
any form to fit a model to the data, only to fit segments of the data. It is thus semi-parametric. 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the average productivity (see equation 10, Section 2), 
labour costs (equation 11) and productivity-labour cost ratio equations (12), under four alternative 
econometric specifications.  Note that, with equation (12) being the difference between equation 
(10) and equation (11), it is logical to verify that η-η
W≈η
G.for each age/gender category. Standard 
errors on display have been computed in a way that accounts for firm-level clustering of 
observations. To get the results on display in Table 2 we use all available observations forming of 
our (unbalanced) panel. 
The first set of parameter estimates come from OLS, using total variation [1]. Then come first 
differences (FD), where parameters are estimated using only within-firm variation [2]. The next 
strategy [3] consists of using first-differenced variables and instrumenting the workforce share first 
differences with second differences and lagged second differences. The last model [4] combines 
first differences and the LP intermediate-goods proxy idea. 
19  
Although they come at the cost of reduced sample sizes, estimations [3] [4] in Table 2 are a priori 
the best insofar as i) the parameters of interest are identified from within-firm variation to control 
for firm unobserved heterogeneity, and ii) that they control for short-term endogeneity biases either 
via the use of LP’s intermediate input proxy, or internal instruments (second differences, lagged 
second differences). In the latter case, note that we estimate the relevant parameters of our model 




Heterogeneity bias might be present since our sample covers all sectors of the Belgian private 
economy and the list of controls included in our models is limited. Even if the introduction of the 
set of dummies (namely year, sector and region) in Fit  can account for part of this heterogeneity 
bias, first-differencing as done in [2], [3] or [4] is still the most powerful way out. But first 
differences alone [2] are not sufficient. The endogeneity in labour input choices is well documented 
problem in the production function estimation literature (e.g. Griliches & Mairesse, 1995) and also 
deserved to be properly and simultaneously treated. And this is precisely what we have attempted to 
do in [3] and [4] by combining first differences with techniques like IV-GMM or LP.  
 
To assess the credibility of our IV-GMM approach [3] we performed a range of diagnostic tests.  
First, an Anderson correlation relevance test.  If the correlation between the instrumental variables 
and the endogenous variable is poor (i.e. if we have “weak” instruments) our parameter estimate 
may be biased. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak (correlation in nil). Rejection of 
the null hypothesis (low p-values) implies that the instruments pass the weak instruments test, i.e. 
they are highly correlated with the endogenous variables. In all our GMM estimates reported in 
Table 2 our instruments pass the Anderson correlation relevance test. Second, to further assess the 
validity of our instrument we use the Hansen-Sargan test. – also called Hansen’s J test – of 
overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments ( i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term), and that the instruments are correctly “excluded” from the 
estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-square in the number of 
overidentifying restrictions.  A failure to reject the null hypothesis (high p-values) implies that the 
instruments are exogenous.  In all our IV-GMM estimates we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
these restrictions are valid. 
                                                 
27  Our estimates are based on Stata’s “ivreg2” suite, with the “gmm” option 
20 In Table 2, parameter estimates (η) for the average productivity equation support the evidence that 
older worker (50-65) - both men and women - are less productive than prime-age (30-49) male 
workers (our reference category). Sizeable (and statistically significant) negative coefficients are 
found across the range of models estimated. Those from the LP model [4] suggest that an increase 
of 10%-points in the share of old male workers depresses productivity by 1.15%-points. Model [3], 
based on IV-GMM, points at a smaller (not statistically significant) drop by only 0.39%-point.  
As to old women both IV-GMM [3] and the LP model [4] deliver large negative estimates of the 
impact of larger shares of old women on productivity. An increase of 10%-points in the share of 
older female workers reduces productivity by 2.52%-points [3] to 2.5% -points [4].  
 
Turning to the average labour cost coefficients (η
W), we see that those for older men and women are 
very similar once we control for firm heterogeneity and/or simultaneity [3][4]. They are negative 
but of small magnitude, although often statistically significant at the 10% level. Estimates for model 
[4] show that a 10%-points rise of the share of older male (female) workers reduces average labour 
cost by 0.46%-point (1.2%-point respectively). In short, particularly for men we do not find strong 
evidence of age-related decline of average labour costs in the Belgian private sector economy; 
something that accords relatively well with the country well-established tradition of seniority-based 
wage progression.  
 
However, regarding the labour demand for older men and women, the most important parameters 
are those of the productivity-labour cost ratio equation (η
G). Their sign informs as to whether a 
lower productivity is fully compensated by lower labour costs. Remember that we posit that a 
negative (and statistically significant) coefficient is a indication that the category of workers is less 
employable than the reference category. Results for old men are mixed. Model [3] delivers negative 
but not statistically significant results. Model [4] suggests that a 10%-points rise of their share 
causes a modest 0.69%-point reduction of the productivity-labour cost ratio. Those for model [3] 
are not statistically significant. 
 
The situation is completely different for old women. Model [3] suggests that a 10%-points 
expansion of their share in the total workforce causes a 2%-points reduction of the productivity-
labour cost ratio. And model [4] points to a 1.3%-points drop of that ratio. 
 
 
21 Table 2 - Parameter estimates (standard errors
£). Older (50-64) male/female and prime-age (30-49) 
female workers productivity (η), average labour costs(η
w) and productivity-labour cost ratio (η
G). 
Overall, unbalanced panel sample. 







Share of 50-64 (Men) 
Productivity (η3m) -0.233*** -0.095***  -0.039  -0.115*** 
std error  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.038)  (0.035) 
Labour Costs (η
w
3m) -0.176***  -0.023*  -0.020  -0.046*** 
std error  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.014) 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio (η
G
3m)   -0.063***  -0.071***  -0.016  -0.069** 
std error  (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.034) 
Share of 30-49 (Women) 
Productivity (η2f) -0.293***  -0.035  -0.114**  -0.034 
std error  (0.021)  (0.033)  (0.046)  (0.040) 
 Labour Costs (η
w
2f) -0.351***  -0.042***  -0.033*  -0.027* 
std error  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.016) 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio (η
G
2f)   0.053***  0.005  -0.081*  -0.006 
std error  (0.018)  (0.032)  (0.045)  (0.040) 
Share of 50-64 (Women) 
Productivity (η3f) -0.610*** -0.229***  -0.252***  -0.250*** 
std error  (0.039)  (0.053)  (0.071)  (0.063) 
 Labour Costs (η
w
3f) -0.643***  -0.060***  -0.052*  -0.120*** 
std error  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.025) 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio (η
G
3f)   0.022  -0.169***  -0.201**  -0.130** 
std error  (0.033)  (0.052)  (0.070)  (0.061) 







workers, share of 
managers + fixed 
effects:  year, 
nace2, region 




a, share of 
blue-collar workers, 
share of managers + 
fixed effects:  year, 
firm 




share of blue-collar 
workers, share of 
managers + fixed 
effects:  year, firm 




a, share of 
blue-collar workers, 
share of managers + 
fixed effects:  year, 
firm 
Test        
      
Instruments: second 
differences and lagged 
second differences. IV 
relevance: Anderson 
canon. corr. LR 
statistic√ 
Overidentifying 
restriction: Hansen J 
statistic √ 
 
Nobs. 76,341  66,383  49,207  52,160 
a: Average number of hours worked by employee on an annual basis, which is strongly correlated to the incidence of part-time work. 
£:Standard errors estimates are robust to firm-level clustering 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
$ Levinsohn and Petrin 
22 23 
 
Table 3 contains a series of important results that can be derived from a further analysis of those 
displayed in Table 2. The first column simply reproduces the estimates for the average productivity 
and productivity-labour cost ratio equations, using our preferred estimation strategies [3] [4]. The 
following columns contain the results of three hypothesis tests aimed at answering key questions 
about age and gender. First, are old women (50-64) less productive [and less employable, due to a 










3f  for 
employability]. Results for IV-GMM model [3] point to a 21.3%-points productivity handicap for 
old women relative to old men. In terms of employability their handicap is of 18.4%-points. Both 
estimates are highly statistically significant. 
 
The second question that can be addressed is whether old women’s productivity[employability] 
handicap relative to old men is driven by more pronounced effects of age on women than on men’s 
productivity[employability]. To that purpose we can first check whether age negatively affects the 
productivity[employability] of men and women separately. As already stated above, the evidence 
for old vis-à-vis prime-age male workers (ie. estimated η3m [η
G
3m]) is mixed. Results for the IV 
model [3] suggest an absence of significant deterioration of productivity[employability], whereas 
LP model [4] is supportive of such a deterioration: -11%-points in terms of productivity and -6.9% 
in terms of employability.  Assessing the situation of older women is less immediate and requires 




3f]). Results for IV model [3] point to a 
13.8%-points statistically-significant productivity handicap for old women relative to prime-age 
women. In terms of employability, the handicap is of 11.9%-points. Similar results are obtained 
with LP model [4], namely a productivity handicap of 21.7%-points, and an employability handicap 
of 12%-points. Furthermore, we can test whether age affects more women’s than men’s 






3m  [H0: η3f -η2f  =η3m]. Results point to a 9 
to 10%-points handicap of women vis-à-vis men in terms of age-related productivity decline, and a 
5.4 to 10%-points handicap in terms of employability decline. But none of these estimates appear 
statistically significant. 
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Table 3 – Parameter estimates (standard errors
£) and hypothesis testing. Older (50-64) male/female and prime-age (30-49) female workers 
productivity (η), average labour costs(η
w) and productivity-labour cost ratio (η
G). Overall, unbalanced panel sample. 
Hyp Test η3f= η3m Hyp Test η3f= η2f Hyp Test  η3f-η2f=η3m 
   Coefficient    η3f- η3m   F Prob  >F  η3f- η2f  F Prob  >F   (η3f-η2f)-η3m F Prob  >F 
[3] - First Differences+  IV-GMM
$ 
Productivity      
Men 50-64 (η3m) -0.039
  (0.038)
Women 30-49  (η2f) -0.114**
  (0.046)
Women 50-64 (η3f) -0.252***
   (0.071)
-0.213*** 7.75 0.0054  -0.138* 3.75  0.059 -0.099  1.47  0.2256 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio      








Women 50-64  (η
G
3f) -0.201**
   (0.070)
-0.184** 6.11 0.0135  -0.119* 2.94  0.0863  -0.103  1.68  0.1955 
[4]- First-Differences + intermediate inputs LP
$$
Productivity      
Men 50-64 (η3m) -0.115***
  (0.035)
Women 30-49  (η2f) -0.034
  (0.040)
Women 50-64 (η3f) -0.250***
   (0.063)
-0.135* 3.78  0.0518  -0.217***  11.72  0.0006  -0.101  1.91  0.1668 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio      








Women 50-64  (η
G
3f) -0.130**
   (0.061)
-0.061  0.80  0.3698  -0.124** 4.01  0.045 -0.054  0.58  0.4470 
£:Standard errors estimates are robust to firm-level clustering 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
$:IV-GMM: Instruments:  second differences and lagged second differences. Tests: IV relevance: Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic  √ Overidentifying restriction: Hansen J statistic √ 
$$: Levinsohn &. PetrinWe have undertaken two further steps in our analysis: 
i) First, we test whether we reach similar conclusions, with regards to those coming from 
the unbalanced panel used so far, when we restrict the analysis to the (smaller) balanced 
panel
28 sample. The rationale for doing is at least twofold. First, data quality is likely to be 
lower with the unbalanced panel. Poor respondents are likely to be overrepresented among 
short-lived firms forming the unbalanced part of the panel. Second, and more importantly, 
entering and exiting firms probably have a-typical productivity-age profiles. Entering firms 
(that tend also to be those exiting the sample due to a high mortality rate among entrants) 
are usually less productive and employ a younger workforce than incumbents. More to the 
point, the short-term dynamic of their productivity performance (which matters a lot in an 
analysis that rests heavily on first-difference estimates) is much less predictable and 
inadequately captured by the identification strategies mobilised in this paper. Bartelmans & 
Doms (2000) reviewing the US evidence, explain that a few years after entry a 
disproportionate number of entrants have moved both to the highest and the lowest 
percentiles of the productivity distribution. 
ii) Second, we examine whether we reach substantially different conclusions, as to the 
productivity-labour cost ratio gender asymmetry, when we further restrict the sample to the 
services industry. We do this because observers a priori posit that age and gender should 
matter less for productivity in a services-based economy than in one where agriculture or 
industry dominates. 
 
4.1. Balanced vs. unbalanced panel 
 
Our main analysis so far has been based on unbalanced panel data that comprise all firms available 
in our sample. By way of sensitivity analysis we now present the parameter estimates (for models 
[3][4] and only for the productivity and productivity-labour cost ratio equations
29) based on 
balanced panel data, consisting only of firms surveyed in each of the 9 years between 1998 and 
2006. This subset comprises 7,933 firms (vs. approx. 9,000 in the unbalanced sample). On average 
                                                 
28   The sample of firms that are observed observed every year between 1998 and 2006. 
29   Those from the labour cost equation (η




(see Appendix 1 for the details) they are quite similar to those of the unbalanced set, be it in terms 
of average value-added, labour cost or size... 
 
If anything, the old worker gender asymmetry highlighted with the unbalanced panel now appears 
stronger. Parameter estimates are exposed on the right-hand side of Table 4, alongside those of 
Table 3 for comparison purposes. For old men, productivity-labour cost parameter estimates (η
G) 
are consistently not statistically different from zero: a 10%-points rise of their share causes a 0%-
point (IV-GMM [3]) to 0.038%-point drop (LP [4]). By contrast, for older women, both models 
deliver coefficients that are larger in magnitude than with the unbalanced panel. IV-GMM [3] shows 
that a 10%-points expansion of their share in the firm’s workforce causes a 2.5%-points reduction 
(vs. 2%-points with the unbalanced panel), whereas LP model [4] points at 1.6%-point fall (vs. 
1.3%-point using the unbalanced panel). 
 
Table 4 also contains the results of three cross-gender tests of equality. In short, these tend to 
reinforce the conclusions obtained with the unbalanced panel. First, old women (50-64) appear 
significantly less productive and less employable than old men. Results for IV-GMM [3] point to a 
25.7%-points productivity handicap (vs. 21.3%-points with the unbalanced panel) of old women 
relative to old men. In terms of employability the old women’s handicap is of 25%-point (vs. 
18.4%-points in Table 3). And both estimates are highly statistically significant. The other results 
on display in Table 4 confirm that age negatively affects the productivity[employability] of women 
Results for IV-GMM [3] point to a 19.6%-points (vs. 13.8%-points with unbal. data) statistically-
significant productivity handicap for old women relative to prime-age women. In terms of 
employability the handicap rises from 11.9 (unbal.) to 18.3%-points with the balanced panel. 
Similar results are obtained with LP model [4], namely a productivity handicap rising from 21.7%-
points (unbal.) to 24.2%-points.  And an employability handicap jumping from 12.4 (unbal.) to 
14.7%-points. There is also stronger evidence that age affects more women’s than men’s 
productivity[employability]. Results, in the last column of Table 4 show female 
productivity[employability] handicaps that are systematically above the 10%-points threshold. And 
most of them are now statistically significant. 
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Table 4 – Parameter estimates (standard errors
£) and hypothesis testing. Older (50-64) male/female and prime-age (30-49) female workers 
productivity (η), average labour costs(η
w) and productivity-labour cost ratio (η
G). Balanced panel sample. 
Hyp Test η3f= η3m Hyp Test η3f= η2f Hyp Test  η3f-η2f=η3m 
   Coef. (unbal.)  Coef. (bal.)    η3f- η3m   F Prob  >F   η3f- η2f  F Prob  >F   (η3f-η2f)-η3m  F Prob  >F 
[3] - First Differences+ lagged IV-GMM
$
Productivity   
Men 50-64 (η3m) -0.039  -0.036
  (0.038)  (0.039)
Women 30-49  (η2f) -0.114**  -0.098**
  (0.046)  (0.048)
Women 50-64 (η3f) -0.252***  -0.293***
   (0.071)  (0.073)
-0.257*** 10.75  0.001 -0.196***  7.21  0.0079  -0.159*  3.69  0.0549 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio  
Men 50-64  (η
G
3m)  -0.016  0.000
  (0.037)  (0.038)
Women 30-49 (η
G
2f)  -0.081*  -0.067
  (0.045)  (0.046)
Women 50-64  (η
G
3f)  -0.201**  -0.250***
   (0.070)  (0.072)
-0.250*** 10.71  0.0011 -0.183**  6.62  0.0101  -0.183**  5.11  0.0238 
#obs 49,211  46,006      
[4]- First-Differences + intermediate inputs LP
$$
Productivity   
Men 50-64 (η3m) -0.115***  -0.093***
  (0.035)  (0.035)
Women 30-49  (η2f) -0.034  -0.035
  (0.040)  (0.042)
Women 50-64 (η3f) -0.250***  -0.276***
   (0.063)  (0.064)
-0.183*** 6.78  0.0092  -0.242**  14.11 0.0002  -0.148**  4.03  0.0488 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio  
Men 50-64  (η
G
3m)  -0.069**  -0.038
  (0.034)  (0.034)
Women 30-49 (η
G
2f)  -0.006  -0.013
  (0.040)  (0.041)
Women 50-64  (η
G
3f)  -0.130**  -0.160**
   (0.061)  (0.063)
-0.122* 3.16 0.0755  -0.147**  5.46  0.0195  -0.110  2.28  0.1307 
#obs 52,162 47,658   
Controls: capital, number of employees, hours worked per employee, share of blue-collar workers, share of managers + fixed effects:  year, firm 
£:Standard errors estimates are robust to firm-level clustering 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
$:IV-GMM: Instruments:  second differences and lagged second differences. Tests: IV relevance: Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic  √ Overidentifying restriction: Hansen J statistic √ 
$$: Levinsohn &. Petrin. 4.2. Balanced panel restricted to the services industry 
Secondly, we have re-estimated the average productivity and productivity-labour cost ratio equations 
(using the unbalanced panel data), but now isolating the services industry.
30 Remember that we do so 
because many observers posit that age and gender differences matter less for productivity in a service-
based economy than in one where industry dominates. Another good reason for focusing on services is 
that women are overrepresented in that industry, in comparison with construction or manufacturing. 
 
Parameter estimates from models [3] [4] are reported on the right-hand side of Table 5, alongside those 
presented in Table 3 and Table 4; again to facilitate comparison. The key result is that the important 
gender asymmetry emerging from the analysis of the panel pooling all sectors is reinforced when using 
services-only data. For older women, both model [3] and model [4] deliver employability coefficients 
(η
G) that are of larger magnitude than those displayed in Table 4 (all sectors pooled). IV-GMM [3] shows 
that a 10%-points expansion of their share in the firm’s workforce causes a 3.5%-points reduction (vs. 
2.5%-points with all sectors pooled), whereas LP model [4] points at a 1.77% reduction (vs. 1.6% when 
all sectors are pooled). 
 
Table 5 also contains the results of the three important cross-gender tests of equality.  And once again, the 
previous conclusions get reinforced. First, old women (50-64) appear much less productive and less 
employable than old men. Results for IV-GMM [3] point to a 28.9%-points productivity handicap (vs. 
25.7%-points when all sectors are pooled) for old women with respect to their male peers. As to 
employability, the old women’s handicap reaches 35.6%-points (vs. 25%-points in Table 4). The other 
results displayed in Table 5 also strengthen the idea that age is particularly harmful to women’s 
productivity[employability]. Results for IV-GMM [3] point to a 25%-points (vs. 19.6%-points when all 
sectors are pooled) statistically-significant productivity handicap for old women relative to prime-age 
ones. In terms of employability, the handicap rises from 18.3 to 26.5%-points. Similar results are obtained 
with LP model [4]. There is also stronger evidence that age is more of an issue for women’s than men’s 
productivity[employability] in the services industry than in the overall private economy. 
The tentative conclusion is that the (now dominant and highly feminized) services industry does not seem to 
offers working conditions to older women, mitigating their productivity or employability disadvantage vis-à-
vis other categories of workers. 
                                                 
30   A detailed definition of these two large sectors in terms of NACE 2 categories is to be found in Appendix 2. 
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Table 5 - Parameter estimates (standard errors
£) and hypothesis testing. Older (50-64) male/female and prime-age (30-49) female workers 
productivity (η), average labour costs(η
w) and productivity-labour cost ratio (η
G). Balanced panel sample, services industry. 
Hyp Test η3f= η3m Hyp Test η3f= η2f Hyp Test  η3f-η2f=η3m 







 η3f- η3m   F Prob  >F  η3f- η2f  F Prob  >F  (η3f-η2f)-η3m F Prob  >F 
[3] - First Differences+ IV-GMM
$   
Productivity   
Men 50-64 (η3m) -0.039 -0.036 -0.067
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.055)
Women 30-49  (η2f) -0.114** -0.098** -0.116*
  (0.046) (0.048) (0.061)
Women 50-64 (η3f) -0.252*** -0.293*** -0.365***
   (0.071) (0.073) (0.092)
-0.298*** 9.03 0.0027  -0.250*** 7.43  0.0064  -0.183*  2.91 0.0881 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio   
Men 50-64  (η
G
3m)  -0.016 0.000 -0.004
  (0.037) (0.038) (0.053)
Women 30-49 (η
G
2f)  -0.081* -0.067 -0.095
  (0.045) (0.046) (0.059)
Women 50-64  (η
G
3f)  -0.201** -0.250*** -0.360***
   (0.070) (0.072) (0.089)
-0.356*** 13.57 0.0002  -0.265*** 8.84 0.0029  -0.261*  6.26  0.0123 
#obs  49,211 46,006 24,330       
[4]- First-Differences + intermediate inputs LP
$$    
Productivity     
Men 50-64 (η3m) -0.115*** -0.093*** -0.089*
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.050)
Women 30-49  (η2f) -0.034 -0.035 -0.026
  (0.040) (0.042) (0.053)
Women 50-64 (η3f) -0.250*** -0.276*** -0.320***
   (0.063) (0.064) (0.080)
-0.232** 6.62 0.0101  -0.294*** 13.46 0.0002  -0.206*  4.68  0.0305 
Prod.-Lab. Costs ratio     
Men 50-64  (η
G
3m)  -0.069** -0.038 -0.010
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.049)
Women 30-49 (η
G
2f)  -0.006 -0.013 0.015
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.052)
Women 50-64  (η
G
3f)  -0.130** -0.160** -0.177**
   (0.061) (0.063) (0.079)
-0.167* 3.60 0.0576  -0.192**  5.98 0.015  -0.182*  3.82 0.0505 
#obs  52,162 47,658 25,506     
Controls: capital, number of employees, hours worked per employee, share of blue-collar workers, share of managers + fixed effects:  year, firm 
Standard errors were computed in a way that accounts for firm-level clustering of observations.  
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
$:IV-GMM: Instruments:  second differences and lagged second differences. Tests: IV relevance: Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic  √ Overidentifying restriction: Hansen J statistic √ 
$$: Levinsohn &. Petrin.  5. Conclusions  
As a socio-economic phenomenon, population ageing in Europe will affect more than its welfare 
systems, as it will also affect the age structure of the workforce. In particular, the share of older 
workers (aged 50+) will rise significantly due to demographics. And this trend will be reinforced by 
policies aimed at maintaining more of those older individuals in employment.  Another point we 
highlight in this paper is that a greying European workforce should also become more female. There 
is indeed robust evidence that older women are still under-represented in employment in comparison 
with older men.  But this should change due to the combined effect of two elements. First, 
participation rates in the 50-60 age range will partially align with those currently observed in some 
Nordic countries (Sweden, Iceland), because successive cohorts of women with an increasing 
history of youth and prime-age participation are reaching older ages. Second, labour policy will try 
to close the gender participation gap that persists beyond 50, independently of the above-mentioned 
trend. 
Optimists may believe that an ageing and feminized workforce will have only a minimal impact on 
firms’ performance and on labour markets. This paper contains evidence, based on the analysis of 
private-economy firm-level panel data, that suggests the opposite. We show that the age/gender 
structure of firms located in Belgium is a key determinant of their productivity-labour cost ratio. 
Employing a larger share of female workers aged 50-64 could translate into lower profitability 
ceteris paribus. Our results show that, using prime-age men as a reference, an increase of 10%-
points in the share of older female workers (50-64) depresses firms’ productivity-labour cost ratio 
by 1.3 to 3.6%-points, depending on the estimation method and the sample chosen. The equivalent 
results for old men range from 0 to 0.69%. A closer look at the results reveals three important 
things. First, the handicap of old female workers vis-à-vis old male workers is driven by a lower 
productivity that is not compensated for by lower average labour costs. Second, older women are 
less productive and employable than prime-age women. Third, some of our results – obtained when 
focussing on balanced panel data and the service industry data - also support the idea that age affects 
women’s productivity[employability] more than men’s.  In short, older women’s employability 
handicap vis-à-vis older men stems from a productivity handicap that is i) not compensated for by lower 
labour costs, and ii) caused by a more pronounced effect of age.  
We finish by briefly mentioning some limits that should be held in mind when interpreting our 
results. First of all, we lack further information about the composition of the workforce (education 
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skills, previous training etc). Although we include proxies (share of blue-collar workers) and apply 
within transformations to controls for most of the firms’ heterogeneity (including in terms of stock 
of human capital), there could still be problems with unobserved short-term changes in human 
capital levels that are related to the age/gender structure. Secondly, only “average firm profiles” are 
calculated, which may imply that we overlook the capacity of some firms to neutralize the effect of 
age and gender on productivity (by implementing ad hoc measures that compensate for the 
age/gender-related loss of performance). Thirdly, the worker sample that we use might not be 
representative of the entire population of older individuals aged 50-64. This means that there is a 
risk of a selection bias, in particular due to early ejection from the workforce of less 
productive/motivated older (male or female) workers. To the extent that this selection bias is an 
issue, we could view our estimated coefficients for older workers’ productivity as lower boundaries 
(in absolute value).  32 
Appendix 
Appendix 1: Belfirst-Carrefour balanced panel. Basic descriptive statistics: mean (standard deviation) 























age   18-29 30-49 50-64  18-29 30-49 50-64
Intermediate 
goods cons. 












66.51 39.13  0.41  109.61  6547  36.15 0.34  0.30  0.10  0.15  0.09  0.02 28707  0.57 0.01  1661.91  1998 7933 
(108.09) (27.12)  (0.40)  (479.79)  (97403)  (4.24)  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (161390)  (0.35) (0.05)  (266.63) 
69.65 40.22  0.40  112.35  6742  36.46 0.33  0.30  0.11  0.14  0.10  0.02 29226  0.57 0.01  1662.30  1999 7933 
(186.13) (22.32)  (0.41)  (477.58)  (101966)  (4.19)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (165727)  (0.35) (0.04)  (262.37) 
69.47 41.00  0.40  115.24  7094  36.73 0.31  0.31  0.11  0.14  0.10  0.02 35342  0.56 0.01  1640.49  2000 7933 
(108.54) (21.85)  (0.42)  (472.12)  (111802)  (4.12)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (228431)  (0.35) (0.04)  (240.04) 
69.59 42.28  0.38  123.16  7580  37.14 0.30  0.31  0.12  0.14  0.11  0.03 36819  0.56 0.01  1623.52  2001 7933 
(100.36) (22.31)  (0.38)  (512.72)  (118939)  (4.07)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (264425)  (0.35) (0.04)  (240.39) 
69.65 43.79  0.36  123.74  7803  37.54 0.29  0.32  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.03 37868  0.56 0.01  1609.17  2002 7933 
(78.13) (22.76)  (0.37)  (517.76)  (128983)  (4.04)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (278567) (0.35) (0.04)  (238.51) 
71.84 44.80  0.36  121.63  8164  38.18 0.27  0.32  0.13  0.12  0.12  0.03 38155  0.55 0.01  1596.44  2003 7933 
(96.52) (22.71)  (0.37)  (464.28)  (137848)  (4.09)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (260458) (0.34) (0.03)  (218.95) 
75.28 46.28  0.38  124.12  8488  38.56 0.26  0.32  0.14  0.12  0.12  0.03 41973  0.55 0.01  1611.12  2004 7933 
(85.84) (25.91)  (0.37)  (494.39)  (147582)  (4.10)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (307199) (0.34) (0.03)  (217.12) 
77.32 47.35  0.37  125.81  7382  38.96 0.26  0.33  0.15  0.11  0.12  0.04 47382  0.55 0.01  1591.85  2005 7933 
(98.98) (27.29)  (0.39)  (512.86)  (53878)  (4.08)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (435990) (0.34) (0.04)  (223.20) 
78.97 48.37  0.37  127.03  7484  39.33 0.25  0.33  0.15  0.11  0.12  0.04 52163  0.54 0.01  1571.02 
2006 7933 
(89.13) (28.98)  (0.40)  (506.13)  (52265)  (4.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.06)  (533189) (0.34) (0.04)  (211.34) Appendix 2 : Sectors (Industry vs Services) and NACE2 codes/definitions 
Nac2 code  Industry 
10 to 12  Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 
13 to 15  Manufacture of textiles, apparel, leather and related products 
16 to 18  Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing 
19  Manufacture of coke, and refined petroleum products 
20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
21  Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical pro 
22 + 23  Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic 
24 + 25  Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 
26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
27  Manufacture of electrical equipment 
28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
29 + 30  Manufacture of transport equipment 
31 to 33  Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and e 
35  Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply 
 36 to 39  Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
41 to 43  Construction 
45 to 47  Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
  Services 
49 to 53  Transportation and storage 
 55 + 56  Accommodation and food service activities 
58 to 60  Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities 
61 Telecommunications 
62 +63  IT and other information services 
64 to 66  Financial and insurance activities 
68  Real estate activities 
 69 to 71  Legal, accounting, management, architecture, engineering, technical 
72  Scientific research and development 
73 to 75   Other professional, scientific and technical activities 
77 to 82  Administrative and support service activities 
90 to 93  Arts, entertainment and recreation 
94 to 96  Other services 
97 to 98  Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods 
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